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reece, financialisation and the EU (Palgrave 2013) by Vassilis Fouskas and 
Constantine Dimoulas, is an essential reading to understand what is behind 
the euro-zone crisis and, especially, the crisis of Greece. The last phase to 
date in the unfolding of the global financial crisis was the outburst of a sovereign 
debt crisis in the Euro area, first in Greece, in May 2010, then in Ireland at the end 
of November 2010, and finally to all the members of the so-called PIIGS group 
(including Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). 
Greece was the first casualty in May 2010. The fact that its debt had been 
downgraded by Moody’s a few days prior did not help to avoid speculation, as well 
as the long time taken by other members of the Euro area before deciding to 
provide a rescue package. This package included the establishment of an ad hoc 
European Financial Stability Facility
i
. Second in line was Ireland, which was 
plagued by the ongoing crisis of its banking system at the end of November 2010. 
Although its European partners had approved a rescue plan providing an overall 
€85 billion (€35 billion to bail out the Irish banking system with the remaining € 50 
billion to help the government’s day-to-day spending), the markets insisted on 
increasing the yields required to buy Irish bonds (as well as Greek, Portuguese, 
Spanish and Italian ones)
ii





 December, 2010 the European Council moved toward the 
institutionalisation of a rescue tool called the European Stability Mechanism, 





However, in December 2010 the financial and economic situation in Europe and 
especially in the eurozone was still heavily compromised. The main problems were 
found in the interplay between sovereign debt difficulties and the weakness of the 
banking sectors of some countries with the Euro. Taken together, these issues could 
bring serious consequences for the sustainability of the EMU as a whole as the 
book clearly points in its first chapter. 
In its assessment of the main risks for the financial stability of the eurozone, the 
ECB differentiated between sources outside the financial system and sources of 
concern inside it (ECB 2010). Outside the financial system, the main sources of 
risk for eurozone financial stability included: the possibility of new concerns with 
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respect to the sustainability of fiscal stances in some Member States; a resurgence 
of global imbalances; vulnerability of non-financial corporations’ balance sheets; 
and macroeconomic problems related to the increase of unemployment and related 
reduction of private credit. Within the eurozone financial system, important risks 
included the possibility of new strains to the financial system; more problems with 
banking exposure to bad debt; increase in the volatility of financial markets in the 
lack of macroeconomic recovery (ECB 2010).  
The main worry that remained, however, was concerning the lack of 
sustainability of public finances in some eurozone countries, which had prompted 
market speculation against Greece. This had already created an adverse feedback 
loop between lower economic growth, bank funding vulnerabilities and fiscal 
imbalances, as was reflected in increases in the persistently growing spread 
between eurozone sovereign bond yields (ECB 2010). On the other hand, the 
profitability of many eurozone large and complex banking groups (LCBGs) 
continued recovering in the second and third quarters of 2010, demonstrating how 
the banking sector had succeeded in shifting the burden of the financial crisis, a 
very well known phenomenon within the literature on financialisation the authors 
quote in the book (ECB 2010). Finally, concerns were voiced with respect to the 
possibility that global financial imbalances could widen again, another 
consequence of fincnaiclisation, thus creating new strains on the fiscal and 
financial sectors of some eurozone countries (ECB 2010).  
Similar worries were confirmed in 2010 and 2011 when the Greek, Irish and 
Portuguese spreads with the German Bund hit, respectively, 1600, 1200 and 1100 
basis points in July 2011. Also, the Spanish and Italian sovereign debt spreads with 
the Bund reached 400 basis points, Belgium hit 200 basis points and France hit 90 
basis points (ECB 2012). 
In 2012 the situation was still extremely worrying, with Spain having to accept 
a sort of bailout for its endangered banking sector of about 100,000 million Euros 
and Italy being widely considered the next in line
iv
. 
Much of the blame for the sovereign debt crisis has been put on the dire 
situation of the PIIGS fiscal stance. Although it cannot be denied that the countries 
considered were not enjoying a healthy budgetary situation, it must be noted that 
the policy of fiscal stimulus to combat the crisis came at a high cost for the fiscal 
position of many other countries.  For example, the newly elected Obama 
administration introduced a stimulus package of $ 800 billion, bringing the 
budgetary deficit to 10 per cent of GDP in 2009. A similar figure was envisaged for 
the same year in Japan, while in the UK the deficit to GDP figure was almost 13 
per cent. In the eurozone, the deficit to GDP was on average only 6 per cent in 
2010, whereas in the mid1990s it had reached more than 7%
v
. The situation was of 
course different in the different countries of the eurozone. However, with respect to 
the case of the PIIGS, two points must be stressed. 
First, some of the countries which have since been affected by the most serious 
wave of attacks to their sovereign debt were by no means performing so badly in 
terms of deficit to GDP in the course of the crisis. In 2010, when the attacks 
started, Greece had a deficit to GDP of 10.3%, only 4.3% higher than the eurozone 
average which was 6% at the time. Portugal and Spain with 9.8% and 9.3% 
respectively were just around 3.8% and 3.3% higher than the Eurozone average
vi
. 
Italy had actually been doing quite well in the course of the crisis, better than the 
average of the eurozone, with a deficit to GDP of only 4.6% in 2010, which had 
even declined from 5.4% in 2009. Of course, commentators then blame the Italians 
for having an outrageous debt to GDP ratio. However, it is worth noting that in 
1995 this ratio was 121.5% against an average of 72.5% in the rest of the future 
eurozone, whereas by 2010 the difference between the Italian performance and the 
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average of the eurozone had actually decreased from 49% in 1995, to 34%
vii
. 
Moreover, in 2010 Spain had a debt to GDP ratio of 61.2% much below the 
eurozone average of 85.2%, and also Ireland and Portugal were not doing that bad 
with figures of 92.5%and 93.3% respectively
viii
. 
Finally, similar performances of the deficit and debt to GPD ratio must be seen 
in the context of spectacularly declining levels of GDP which by definition, if only 
for mathematical reasons, increase their values. Between 2007 and 2009, Ireland 
lost 12.2% of its real GDP, Greece 6.5%, Spain 7.2%, Italy 6.8% and Portugal 
5.3%  
In an effort to identify the relation between the global financial crisis and the 
crisis of the eurozone, it is important to ask, along with this book, two questions
ix
: 
First, are the larger spreads recorded in the course of the crisis a consequence of 
larger fiscal deficits and debt or do they show a change in the global political 
economy? 
Second, what is the historical trajectory followed by Greece in terms of fiscal 
policy before the global financial crisis? 
In other words, was it completely the fault of Greece if the sovereign debt crisis 
erupted when it did? 
The authors take a long-term view on this question to answer that the crisis in 
Greece, as well as in the rest of the Euro-zone, was the necessary consequence of 
long last fault-lines in the global political economy. By assessing the historical 
development of Greek sovereign debt from the end of the 19
th
 Century to our days, 
the book is able to put the question of fiscal debt in an historical perspective which 
makes reference to global shift in the balance of power to identify the real causes 
of the current disease. 
Of course this means that also the recipies to resolve the problems cannot and 
shall not be found in ad-hoc measures aimed at curtailing the capacities of the 
Greek economy to address its long-lasting fault lines. 
To conclude there is no doubt in the mind of the author of this review that this 
book is an essential reading to make sense of the latest events in the Eurozone from 
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